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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
•

*

EHLERS & EHLERS ARCHITECTS,
a Utah corporation,

*

*

•

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

•

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
CARBON COUNTY,
A public corporation,
Defendant-Respondent.

Appeal No. 900051-CA
*
*
*

•

•

•

JURISDICTION
The instant appeal was filed HI l In1 Utah Supreme Court
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. (UCA) §78-2-2(3) ( j) (1953 as amended)
which transferred t:,i

appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals

pursuant to UCA §78-2-2(4).

The Utah Couit ol Appeals obtained

jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to UCA §7 8-2a-3(2) (j) .
This appeal i: i

.nmaiy Judgment granted

defendant/respondent Carbon County (Carbon) tvy Sfn/eiit h District
Judge Boyd Bunnell.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Is Carbon estopped to deny a contract with
plaintiff/appellant Ehlers & Ehlers (Ehlers)?
2. Did the actions ol Carbon revi ve ti le previous contract
between itself <::. Ehlers?
r- " : - > .- ui Carbon result in a new and binding
contract with Ehlers?
4.

Was summary judgment properly granted by Judge Bunnell?

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
UCA §17-5-5
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure (URCP) 56.
The text of these rules will be found in the Addenda.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Ehlers is a professional corporation with only one present
shareholder, Jack Ehlers.

Sometime during 1977 Ehlers was

requested by Carbon to design a building to be known as the
Carbon County Criminal Justice Center.

This building was to have

courtrooms, commission chambers, and a jail, among other things.
A standard contract was prepared and signed on 1 February 1978, a
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

The parties had a

previous relationship at that time, as Ehlers had remodelled a
school for them.

See p. 9, 11. 16-17 of the Ehlers deposition.

It was understood by all that Ehlers would do preparatory
work on the Justice Center, but that full and final progress on
the Justice Center would have to await a favorable vote on a bond
issue, which took place on 15 March 1981. The bond issue failed,
and Ehlers accepted $56,000.00 as payment in full for what he had
already done.

Although the project was halted at that time,

Ehlers was told that if the project would be revived later, he
would get the contract. See deposition of Ehlers, p. 50, 11. 7-8
and pp. 58-60.
For four years nothing happened, and then Ehlers received a
call from Carbon's agent Lee Semken.

Semken was then chairman of

the Carbon County Commission, and called Ehlers on 8 January 1985

to tell him the project had been revived as the Tri-Court
Complex, a building similar to the Justice Center.

According to

Ehlers:
"It was a telephone call and, well, I hung up the
phone, and the courthouse is a go is word for word,
yes. Then he said he'd like to see me on Tuesday at
8:00, and then he went on to discuss, and I didn't
write this in, that it was a very important thing that
we get it done immediately and asked me if I could
handle a time schedule of around six weeks, and I said
you bet, and he said get the wheels rolling so I did."
Deposition, p. 61, 11. 17-23.
In addition, Semken asked Ehlers to meet him in his office
on 15 January 1985, see deposition p. 61, 1. 19. At this
meeting, not only was Semken present, but Floyd Marx and Guido
Rachiele as well, and they met in the commission chambers, see
deposition p. 62, 11. 24-25.

This meeting lasted for at least

three hours, with Semken, who was the commission chairman, and
Marx and Rachiele, who were the other two commissioners.
this meeting the project was discussed at some length.

During

See

deposition p. 63, 11. 11-17.
Ehlers acted upon the direction of Semken and the rest of
the commissioners, and he stated that he went to considerable
expense to get ready for the project, including doubling the size
of his office, hiring new personnel, contacting engineering firms
and telling them to put aside other projects to help him, and in
general went to a great deal of time and effort.

See deposition

p. 62, 11. 2-7. After approximately two months of hard work on
the project Ehlers was fired by Commissioner Rachiele.
deposition p. 66, 11. 10-17.

See

Ehlers asked Lee Semken why he had been terminated, and then
presented Carbon with a bill for his efforts in the previous two
months, which was not paid.

He stated:

Lee (Semken) said that Judge Bunnel (sic) had a
favorite in Eric Sandstrom, he'd worked with him on a
project before, and I can certainly understand that, we
all have favorites. That's why attorneys are hired and
architects are hired by different people, and he said
that there were state funds involved, that he had
talked to the state and they were supporting him and
that they were going to use Eric Sandstrom. Lee said
that he couldn't fight City Hall. I told him Guido
(Rachiele) had fired me Thursday. I think that's
probably the first Lee knew of that. I think he
thought he was bringing the bad tiding, and I asked Lee
to confirm this by a letter and I would bill for the
close-out costs as per the contract. Now, I never got
any more correspondence from them after sending that,
or after that I received nothing so I sent that last
letter.
Deposition p. 70, 11. 3-18.
This action was filed in 1986.

Carbon brought a summary

judgment motion, which was ruled upon by Judge Bunnell on 1
November 1989, and judgment was actually entered on 15 November
1989.

Ehlers brought a Motion for Reconsideration on 13 November

1989, which was denied on 15 November 1989.
filed 30 November 1989.

Notice of appeal was

Copies of these various motions,

judgments, rulings, and the Notice of Appeal are attached hereto
in chronological order as Exhibits B through J.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I
CARBON COUNTY IS ESTOPPED TO DENY A CONTRACT WITH EHLERS
All of the classical indicia of detrimental reliance and
estoppel are present in this case.

Ehlers reasonably relied upon

the assertions of the full county commission in a meeting in the
commission chambers, and went to a great deal of effort to meet
the hasty deadlines the commissioners set for him.

After two

months of work the commission simply fired him without warning.
Although estoppel arguments are commonly not allowed against
government entities, they are proper when the facts are definite
and the injustice is great, as in this action.
II
THE ACTIONS OF CARBON COUNTY REVIVED THE PREVIOUS CONTRACT
The original written contract between Carbon and Ehlers was
suspended by mutual assent after the bond issue failed, but
Ehlers was told that if the funding ever became available, he
would get the job.

Four years later Ehlers was told that the

project had been revived by one member of the commission, and
this offer was ratified by the full commission in a meeting in
their chambers.

Ehlers accepted this renewed offer for a

unilateral contract by performing the duties needed to bring this
project to fruition, and Carbon could not withdraw their offer
with impunity after Ehlers had begun this process of acceptance.
Ill
THE ACTIONS OF CARBON COUNTY CREATED A NEW CONTRACT
The Chairman of the Carbon County Commission made Ehlers an
offer, Ehlers accepted with clear and definite performance, and
all the elements of a contract were present.

This represented a

binding unilateral contract between the parties.

IV
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS IMPROVIDENTLY GRANTED
Summary judgment is never proper when their are material
issues of fact that must be decided by the trier of fact.

Three

extremely important issues were raised by Ehlers, and they could
not possibly have been properly dismissed by the court without a
full trial on the merits.

These issues were whether the old

contract had been revived, whether a new contract had been
performed, and whether the county was estopped to deny the
contract.
ARGUMENT
I
CARBON COUNTY IS ESTOPPED TO DENY A CONTRACT WITH EHLERS
Carbon is estopped to deny the contract between itself and
Ehlers.

Estoppel is defined as:

1) an admission, statement, or act inconsistent with
the claim afterwards asserted; 2) action by the other
party on the faith of such admission, statement, or
act; and 3) injury to such party resulting from
allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate
such admission, statement, or act.
Celebrity Clubf Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 602 P.2d
689, 694 (Utah 1979).
Estoppel arguments are generally not recognized against the
government on public policy grounds.

The leading case on

estoppel and government entities is Utah State University of
Agriculture and Applied Science v. Sutro and Co., 646 P.2d 715
(Utah 1982).

The Sutro court gave a detailed analysis on

estoppel in general and against the government, and held:

A decision which recognized that there are sometimes
circumstances where the interests of justice demand
allowing the doctrine of estoppel to be asserted
against the government was issued over 100 years ago by
the United States Supreme court in Hackett v. City of
Ottawa. There the city official had represented that
bonds were issued for a lawful purpose and issued them
under the city's seal, but it was later determined that
their issuance had not been in accordance with lawful
authority. It was held that because such obvious
unfairness would otherwise result to purchasers of the
bonds, the city was estopped from asserting that they
had been unlawfully issued and were void.
Another case which we regard as helpful and
representing sound reasoning on this subject is that of
United States v. Lazy FC Ranch. After reviewing the
case law, the court stated that estoppel should be
allowed as a defense against the government where to do
otherwise would work a serious injustice, and the
public interest would not be unduly damaged by the
interposition of that defense. In its discussion, the
court engaged in what has been referred to as a
"balancing of equities" test and concluded that under
the facts of that case a grave injustice would result
if the government were not held responsible for the
information it had given the Ranch and which the latter
had relied on; and that under the circumstances there
would be no serious adverse effect either on public
policy or the interest of the government by permitting
the Ranch partners to retain the funds they had
received.
In the later case of United States v. Wharton, the
court reiterated the standard set forth in Lazy FC
Ranch. The defendants asserted the government was
estopped by the affirmative misconduct on the part of
government officials who gave them incorrect
information. The court noted the precaution that not
every form of official misinformation would be
sufficient to estop the government, but where advice
given was so closely related to basic fairness and the
decision-making process, the government should be
estopped from disavowing the representation made
because to do so would work a serious injustice on the
defendant and the interest of the public would not be
unduly threatened or damaged.
Our own court has similarly long since taken its
position in accord with the doctrine just discussed, of
looking through the rigidity of a general rule to see
and apply and exception where it is plain that the
interest of justice so require. In the case of Wall v.
Salt Lake City, the city by affirmative acts and
representation had allowed the plaintiffs to take

possession of property which was difficult for the city
to utilize as a street. In reliance thereon, the
plaintiffs had possessed and cared for the property
for over 20 years. The court held that the city was
estopped from repudiating its representations and
reclaiming the property. The ruling in the Wall case
was restated with approval in the later case of Tooele
City v. Elkinqton, though the court was not persuaded
that the factual requirements for invoking estoppel
against the city were met.
We have recently had occasion to confront another
situation where egregious injury would result unless
estoppel was applied against a governmental
institution. In Celebrity Club v. Utah Liquor Control
Commission, the plaintiff club had made large
expenditures, relying on assurances of an official of
the Liquor Commission, which this court held could not
be repudiated to the injury of the club.
We regard the authorities referred to above as
well reasoned, with which our sense of justice is in
harmony, and support of the well-recognized policy of
the law as earlier set forth herein, to be the effect
that the rule which precludes the assertion of estoppel
against the government is sound and generally should be
applied, except only in appropriate circumstances as
hereinabove stated, where the interests of justice
mandate an exception to that general rule. In cases
where such an issue arises, the critical inquiry is
whether it appears that the facts may be found with
such certainty, and the injustice to be suffered is of
sufficient gravity, to invoke the exception. And in
case there is doubt on such matters, it should be
resolved in favor of permitting the party to have a
trial of the issue, as opposed to summary rejections
thereof.
Id. at 719-20. (emphasis added, citations omitted.)
Plaintiff's case fits very nicely into the exceptions.
First, the facts may be found with certainty, there are phone
records, diary entries, etc., which document the actions of the
principals involved.

Second, plaintiff expended approximately

$64,000.00 in various costs in reliance upon the assertions of
defendant's agent, Semken.

To lose $64,000.00 is a grave

injustice indeed.
8

UCA §17-5-5 deals with actions by the various county
commissions, defines what constitutes a quorum, and states in
part:

"Not less than two members shall constitute a quorum for

the transaction of business, and no act of the board shall be
valid or binding unless two members concur therein."

Ehlers was

by no means relying upon only the unsupported words of Semken
alone.

We find in Ehlers deposition, p. 61^11.1-22, that Semken

called Ehlers on 8 January 1985, told him the project was "a go,"
and asked him if he could be ready in six weeks.

Semken asked

Ehlers to meet him in his office on 15 January 1985, see
deposition p. 61,1. 19. At this meeting, not only was Semken
present, but Floyd Marx and Guido Rachiele as well, and they met
in the commission chambers, see deposition p. 62, 11. 24-25.
This meeting lasted for at least three hours, with Semken, who
was the commission chairman, and Marx and Rachiele, who were the
other commissioners.

During this meeting the project was

discussed at some length.

See deposition p. 63, 11. 11-17.

Plaintiff had a long meeting with a quorum pursuant to the
above statute, in the commission chambers.

During this meeting

pressure was put upon plaintiff to get the project done as
quickly as possible, and plaintiff relied upon these assertions
to his detriment.

This is estoppel, plain and simple.

If

plaintiff may not reasonably rely upon the assertions of the
entire commission speaking at a meeting in their official
chambers, what may he rely upon?
Furthermore, as noted with emphasis supra, in cases where

estoppel is asserted against the government, the policy in Utah
is to allow a full trial on the merits, rather than summary
disposition.
II
THE ACTIONS OF CARBON COUNTY REVIVED THE PREVIOUS CONTRACT
During the deposition of Mr. Ehlers, he was asked about the
bond issue and the courthouse project, and specifically about the
status of the project after the bond issue failed.

He replied:

At that time I was aware that it would not go at that
time, but I was always told and aware that at some time
it would move on; therefore, I would keep dropping in
as I went to Moab or to Emery or whatever just to touch
base with the commissioners.
Deposition, p. 58 1. 24 through p. 59 1. 3.
The meaning of this is plain, and that meaning is that the
offer for the contract was still open, pending a solution to the
funding problem.

Williston On Contracts, Third Edition §45,

deals with offers where something is reserved for future
determination.

It states:

Although a promise may be sufficiently definite when it
contains an option given to the promisor or promisee,
yet if an essential element is reserved for the future
agreement of both parties, the promise can give rise to
no legal obligation until such future agreement.
In this case the future agreement came to pass, and the original
contract continued in a state of suspended animation until Semken
uttered the magic words of offer, "the courthouse is a go." The
details of this offer could be filled in and made more definite
by referring to the original contract, see Williston §47. The
two buildings were quite similar, the major difference between
10

the two being that the Tri-Court Complex would not have a jail or
commission chambers.
Thus the contract was a suspended but continuing one between
Ehlers and Carbon.

Carbon revived it with a new and definite

offer, Ehlers accepted by deed and word, and Ehlers is entitled
to his damages for Carbon's breach thereof.
Ill
THE ACTIONS OF CARBON COUNTY CONSTITUTED A NEW CONTRACT
To revert for a moment to the first day of contracts class,
offer plus acceptance equals contract.

As noted supra

in the

statement of the case, Semken called Ehlers and said "the
courthouse is a go."

This offer was ratified by the entire

commission by holding a meeting in their chambers with Ehlers.
This was an offer for a unilateral contract, a promise for an
act, that act being the design and construction of the Tri-Court
Complex.

Ehlers accepted by increasing his staff, holding

meetings with the commission, etc.

This part performance of a

unilateral contract makes it binding.
§37.

See 17 AmJur 2d Contracts

in addition the Restatement (Second) of Contracts

specifically addresses these issues.
following:

In S89B(2) we find the

"An offer which the offeror should reasonably expect

to induce action or forbearance of a substantial character on the
part of the offeree before acceptance and which does induce such
action or forbearance is binding as an option contract to the
extent necessary to avoid injustice."
The injustice of this situation is open and obvious. An

architect is approached by the Chairman of the County Commission
to design a building with great haste.

The architect meets with

the full commission in the commission chambers, and the project
is discussed at great length.

The architect hires staff, delays

other projects, and in general makes very substantial commitments
based on the assertions of the full commission and past
experience.

Then a powerful political figure decides he wants

another man to design the building, and after two months of
intense labor the architect is unceremoniously fired, and the
county refuses to reimburse him for his considerable losses.

The

county then tries to hide behind governmental immunity, while the
architect must bear devastating losses of $64,000.00.

This is a

textbook example of the damages that §89B(2) was designed to
recompense.
IV
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS IMPROVIDENTLY GRANTED
URCP 56(c) states that judgment is proper "if the pleadings,
depositions...(etc.) show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact..."

The wording makes it plain that only one

genuine issue need be raised by the opponent to deny summary
judgment to the movant.

Ehlers raised at least two, and a third

one in the Motion for Reconsideration.

The issues that needed to

be addressed in this case were 1) whether the conduct of Carbon
revived the contract, and 2) whether a new contract was formed
between Ehlers and Carbon.

These issues were raised in Ehlers

"Response Memorandum To Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment,"

attached hereto as Exhibit D.

The estoppel issue was thoroughly

addressed in the Motion for Reconsideration, attached hereto as
Exhibits G and H.

These were issues of fact, to be decided by

the trier of fact, and were not properly susceptible to summary
disposition in this manner.
It is the stated policy of this court to allow a full trial
when issues of estoppel and governmental immunity are raised in
an action.
supra,

The issue was directly addressed in the Sutro case

which held:
[T]he critical inquiry is whether it appears that the
facts may be found with such certainty, and the
injustice to be suffered is of sufficient gravity, to
invoke the exception. And in case there is doubt on
such matters, it should be resolved in favor of
permitting the party to have a trial of the issue, as
opposed to summary rejections thereof. Id. at 719-20.
(citations omitted.)

There can be no doubt whatsoever that there has been a grave
injustice to Ehlers, and everyone in this position deserves a day
in court.
CONCLUSION
Ehlers and Carbon had a contract to build a courthouse, and
by mutual agreement that contract was put into suspended
animation at the time the bond issue failed.

However, it was

agreed between the parties that if the funding became available
in the future, the building would become a viable project again.
The building was funded four years later, the full county
commission ratified the offer of Semken, and Ehlers went to
considerable expense to meet the accelerated timetable that the
commission insisted upon. After two months of hard work, a
i 9

member of the commission discharged him because of political
pressure, and now the county wishes to hide behind the doctrine
of immunity, rather than face its obligation in an honorable
manner.

This is injustice of the most transparent sort, and the

county is estopped to deny the contract that was formed.
Summary judgment was not proper in this case.

There were

many issues that needed to be addressed, which were properly
raised before the court.

URCP 56 states that there need be only

one genuine issue of material fact to resist summary judgment.
Ehlers prays that this court reverse the summary judgment of
Judge Bunnell, and remand this case for a full trial on the
issues.

As noted supra,

the ruling of this court in the Sutro

case cannot be overemphasized, and it stated:
[T]he critical inquiry is whether it appears that the
facts may be found with such certainty, and the
injustice to be suffered is of sufficient gravity, to
invoke the exception. And in case there is doubt on
such matters, it should be resolved in favor of
permitting the party to have a trial of the issue, as
opposed to summary rejections thereof.
Id.

at 719-20. (citations omitted.)

Equity and justice can settle for no less.
DATED this

- ^

day of March, 1990.
SPAFFORD & SPAFFORD, P.C.
- /

^V"
..-y-,,^

Aly.l/

L. .Charles Spafford
Attorney for Ehlers

MAILING CERTIFICATE
The undersigned hereby certifies that he mailed a copy of
the above document to John Schindler, 120 E. Main, Pr^c^, UT
84501 on the date above.
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THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS
- S .

M-* DEPOSITION
EXHIBIT
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-

^

A M Document B131

Standard Form of Agreement Between
Owner and Architect
on a basis of a

PERCENTAGE OF CONSTRUCTION COST
THIS DOCUMENT HAS IMPORTANT LEGAL CONSEQUENCES; CONSULTATION WITH
AN ATTORNEY IS ENCOURAGED WITH RESPECT TO ITS COMPLETION OR

MODIFICATION

AGREEMENT
made this
Hundred and

First

day of

February

in the year of Nineteen

Seventy-eight

BETWEEN
THE CARBON COUNTY COMMISSION FOR CARBON COUNTY

the Owner, and

EHLERS AND EHLERS ARCHITECTS, INCORPORATED

the Architect-

It is the intention of the Owner to erect the Carbon County Criminal Justice Center

hereinafter referred to as the Project.

The Owner and the Architect agree as set forth below.
AIA DOCUMENT B131 • OWNER-ARCHITECT AGREEMENT (PERCENTAGE) • APRIL 1970 EDITION • AIA*
€ 1970 • THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, 1735 NEW YORK AVE., N.W., WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006

""
1

I. THE ARCHITECT shall provide professional services for the Project in accordance with the Terms
and Conditions of this Agreement

II. THE OWNER shall compensate the Architect, in accordance with the Terms and Conditions of
this Agreement, as follows:
a. FOR THE ARCHITECT'S BASIC SERVICES, as described in Paragraph 1.1, Basic Compensation
computed at the following percentages of the Construction Cost, as defined in Article 3, for
portions of the Project to be awarded under
A Single Stipulated Sum Contract

per cent (

(preferred)

Separate Stipulated Sum Contracts

per cent (

A Single Cost Plus Fee Contract

per cent (

Separate Cost Plus Fee Contracts

per cent (

6
8
8
10

%)
%)
%)
%)

AN INITIAL PAYMENT of
F i v e Hundred
dollars ($ 5 0 0 . 0 0
shall be made upon the execution of this Agreement and credited to the Owner's account

)

If the Building is to be a remodel and addition to an existing
structure, it is agreed that the above percentages are to be
increased by two (2%) percent*
b. FOR THE ARCHITECT'S ADDITIONAL SERVICES, as described in Paragraph 1.3, compensation
computed as follows:
Principals' time at the fixed rate of
Thirty-five
per hour. For the purposes of this Agreement, the Principals are:

dollars ($

35.00

)

A. Jack Ehlers

Employees' time computed at a multiple of
two and o n e - h a l f
times the employees' Direct Personnel Expense, as defined in Article 4.

(

2-1/2

)

Additional services of professional consultants engaged for the norma! structural, mechanical
and electrical engineering services at a multiple of One and O n e - h a l f
(
1-1/2
) times the amount billed to the Architect for such additional services.
Services of other professional consultants at a multiple of
one and o n e - h a l f
(
1-1/2
) times the amount billed to the Architect for such services.
The rates and multiples set forth In this Paragraph lib will be subject to renegotiation if the
services covered by this Agreement have not been completed within
twenty-four
( 24
) months of the date hereof.
c FOR THE ARCHITECT'S REIMBURSABLE EXPENSES, amounts expended as defined in Article 5.
d. THE TIMES AND FURTHER CONDITIONS OF PAYMENT shall be as described in Article 6.

AIA DOCUMENT B131 • OWNER-ARCHITECT AGREEMENT (PERCENTAGE) • APRIL 1970 EDITION • AIA*
© 1970 • THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE O f ARCHITECTS, 1735 NEW YORK AVE., N.W., WASHINGTON, D. C 20006

TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN OWNER AND ARCHITECT

ARTICLE 1
ARCHITECT'S SERVICES
1.1

BASIC SERVICES
The Architect's Basic Services consist of the five
phases described below and include normal structural, mechanical and electrical engineering services.

SCHEMATIC DESIGN PHASE
1.1.1 The Architect shall consult with the Owner to ascertain the requirements of the Project and shall confirm
such requirements to the Owner.
1.1.2 The Architect shall prepare Schematic Design
Studies consisting of drawings and other documents illustrating the scale and relationship of Project components
for approval by the Owner,
1.13 The Architect shall submit to the Owner a Statement of Probable Construction Cost based on current
area, volume or other unit costs.
DESIGN DEVELOPMENT PHASE
1.1.4 The Architect shall prepare from the approved
Schematic Design Studies, for approval by the Owner, the
Design Development Documents consisting of drawings
and other documents to fix and describe the size and
character of the entire Project as to structural, mechanical and electrical systems, materials and such other essentials as may be appropriate.
1.1.5 The Architect shall submit to the Owner a further
Statement of Probable Construction Cost.
CONSTRUCTION DOCUMENTS PHASE
1.1.6 The Architect shall prepare from the approved Design Development Documents, for approval by the Owner, Working Drawings and Specifications setting forth in
detail the requirements for the construction of the entire
Project including the necessary bidding information, and
shall assist in the preparation of bidding forms, the Conditions of the Contract, and the form of Agreement between the Owner and the Contractor.
1.1.7 The Architect shall advise the Owner of any adjustments to previous Statements of Probable Construction
Cost indicated by changes in requirements or general
market conditions.
1.1.8 The Architect shall assist the Owner in filing the
required documents for the approval of governmental
authorities having jurisdiction over the Project.
•IDDING OR NEGOTIATION PHASE
1.1.9 The Architect, following the Owner's approval of
the Construction Documents and of the latest Statement
of Probable Construction Cost, shall assist the Owner in

obtaining bids or negotiated proposals, and in awarding
and preparing construction contracts.
CONSTRUCTION PHASE — ADMINISTRATION
OF THE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT

1.1.10 The Construction Phase will commence with the
award of the Construction Contract and will terminate
when the final Certificate for Payment is issued to the
Owner.
1.1.11 The Architect shall provide Administration of the
Construction Contract as set forth in Articles 1 through 14
inclusive of the latest edition of AIA Document A201, General Conditions of the Contract for Construction, and the
extent of his duties and responsibilities and the limitations
of his authority as assigned thereunder shall not be modified without his written consent.
1.1.12 The Architect as the representative of the Owner
during the Construction Phase, shall advise and consult
with the Owner and all of the Owner's instructions to the
Contractor shall be issued through the Architect. The
Architect shall have authority to act on behalf of the
Owner to the extent provided in the General Conditions
unless otherwise modified in writing.
1.1.13 The Architect shall at all times have access to
the Work wherever it is in preparation or progress.
1.1.14 The Architect shall make periodic visits to the
site to familiarize himself generally with the progress and
quality of the Work and to determine in general if the
Work is proceeding in accordance with the Contract Documents. On the basis of his on-site observations as an
architect, he shall endeavor to guard the Owner against
defects and deficiencies in the Work of the Contractor.
The Architect shall not be required to make exhaustive
or continuous on-site inspections to check the quality or
quantity of the Work. The Architect shall not be responsible for construction means, methods, techniques, sequences or procedures, or for safety precautions and
programs in connection with the Work, and he shall not
be responsible for the Contractor's failure to carry out the
Work in accordance with the Contract Documents.
1.1.15 Based on such observations at the site and on the
Contractor's Applications for Payment, the Architect shall
determine the amount owing to the Contractor and shall
issue Certificates for Payment in such amounts. The issuance of a Certificate for Payment shall constitute a representation by the Architect to the Owner, based on the
Architect's observations at the site as provided in Subparagraph 1.1.14 and on the data comprising the Application for Payment, that the Work has progressed to the
point indicated; that to the best of the Architect's knowledge, information and belief, the quality of the Work is
in accordance with the Contract Documents (subject to
an evali/ation of the Work for conformance with the Contract Documents upon Substantial Completion, to the results of any subsequent tests required by the Contract Doc-

AIA DOCUMENT S131 • OWNER-ARCHITECT ACREEMENT (PERCENTAGE) • APRIL 1970 EDITION • AIA*
€ 1970 • THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, 1735 NEW YORK AVE., N.W., WASHINGTON, D. C 20006

3

urnents, to minor deviations from the Contract Documents
correctable prior to completion, and to any specific qualifications stated in the Certificate for Payment); and that
the Contractor isentitled to payment in the amount certified. By issuing a Certificate for Payment, the Architect
shall not be deemed to represent that he has made any
examination to ascertain how and for what purpose the
Contractor has used the moneys paid on account of the
Contract Sum.
1.1.16 The Architect shall be, in the first instance, the
interpreter of the requirements of the Contract Documents and the impartial judge of the performance thereunder by both the Owner and Contractor. The Architect
shall make decisions on all claims of the Owner or Contractor relating to the execution and progress of the Work
and on all other matters or questions related thereto.
The Architect's decisions in matters relating to artistic
effect shall be final if consistent with the intent of the
Contract Documents.
1.1.17 The Architect shall have authority to reject Work
which does not conform to the Contract Documents.
Whenever, in his reasonable opinion, he considers it necessary or advisable to insure the proper implementation of
the intent of the Contract Documents, he will have authority to require special inspection or testing of any Work in
accordance with the provisions of the Contract Documents whether or not such Work be then fabricated, installed or completed.
1.1.18 The Architect shall review and approve shop
drawings, samples, and other submissions of the Contractor only for conformance with the design concept of the
Project and for compliance with the information given
in the Contract Documents.
1.1.19 The Architect shall prepare Change Orders.
1.1.20 The Architect shall conduct inspections to determine the Dates of Substantial Completion and final
completion, shall receive and review written guarantees
and related documents assembled by the Contractor, and
shall issue a final Certificate for Payment
1.1.21 The Architect shall not be responsible for the
acts or omissions of the Contractor, or any Subcontractors,
or any of the Contractor's or Subcontractors' agents or
employees, or any other persons performing arty of the
Work.
1.2

PROJECT REPRESENTATION BEYOND BASIC SERVICES

1.2.1 If more extensive representation at the site than
is described under Subparagraphs 1.1.10 through 1.1.21
inclusive is required, and if the Owner and Architect agree,
the Architect shall provide one or more Full-Time Project
Representatives to assist the Architect.
1.2.2 Such Full-Time Project Representatives shall be
selected, employed and directed by the Architect, and the
Architect shall be compensated therefor as mutually
agreed between the Owner and the Architect as set forth
in an exhibit appended to this Agreement
1.2.3 The duties, responsibilities and limitations of authority of such Full-Time Project Representatives shall be
set forth in an exhibit appended to this Agreement
1.2.4 Through the on-site observations by Full-Time Project Representatives of the Work in progress, the Architect

4

shall endeavor to provide further protection for the
Owner against defects in the Work, but the furnishing of
such project representation shall not make the Architect
responsible for construction means, methods, techniques,
sequences or procedures, or for safety precautions and programs, or for the Contractor's failure to perform the Work
in accordance with the Contract Documents.
1.3

ADDITIONAL SERVICES
If any of the following Additional Services are
authorized by the Owner, they shall be paid for by
the Owner as hereinbefore provided.
1 3 . 1 Providing special analyses of the Owner's needs,
and programming the requirements of the Project
1 3 . 2 Providing financial feasibility or other special
studies.
1 3 3 Providing planning surveys, site evaluations, or
comparative studies of prospective sites.
1 3 . 4 Providing design services relative to future facilities, systems and equipment which are not intended to be
constructed as part of the Project
133
Providing services to investigate existing conditions or facilities or to make measured drawings thereof,
or to verify the accuracy of drawings or other information furnished by the Owner.
1 3 . 6 Preparing documents for alternate bids or out-ofsequence services requested by the Owner.
1 3 . 7 Providing Detailed Estimates of Construction Cost
or detailed quantity surveys or inventories of material,
equipment and labor.
1 3 . 8 Providing interior design and other services required for or in connection with the selection of furniture
and furnishings.
1 3 . 9 Providing services for planning tenant or rental
spaces.
1.3.10 Making major revisions in Drawings, Specifications or other documents when such revisions are inconsistent with written approvals or instructions previously
given and are due to causes beyond the control of the
Architect.
1.3.11 Preparing supporting data and other services in
connection with Change Orders if the change in the Basic
Compensation resulting from the adjusted Contract Sum
is not commensurate with the services required of the
Architect
13.12 Making investigations involving detailed appraisals and valuations of existing facilities, and surveys
or inventories required in connection with construction
performed by the Owner.
1.3.13 Providing consultation concerning replacement
of any Work damaged by fire or other cause during construction, and furnishing professional services of the type
set forth in Paragraph 1.1 as may be required in connection
with the replacement of such Work.
1.3.14 Providing professional services made necessary
by the default of the Contractor or by major defects in
the Work of the Contractor in the performance of the
Construction Contract.
1.3.15 Preparing a set of reproducible record prints of
drawings showing significant changes in the Work made
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during the construction process, based on marked-up
prints, drawings and other data furnished by the Contractor
to the Architect.
1.3*16 Providing extensive assistance in the utilization
of any equipment or system such as initial $tart-up or testing, adjusting and balancing, preparation of operating and
maintenance manuals, training personnel for operation and
maintenance, and consultation during operation.
1 3 . 1 7 Providing Contract Administration and observation of construction after the Construction Contract Time
has been exceeded or extended by more than 10 days
through no fault of the Architect
U . I 8 Providing services after issuance to the Owner of
the final Certificate for Payment.
U.19
Preparing to serve or serving as an expert witness
in connection with any public hearing, arbitration proceeding or legal proceeding.
1 3 . 2 0 Providing services of professional consultants for
other than the normal structural, mechanical and electrical engineering services for the Project.
1 3 . 2 1 Providing any other services not otherwise included in this Agreement or not customarily furnished in
accordance with generally accepted architectural practice.

ARTICLE 2
THE OWNER'S RESPONSIBILITIES
2.1 The Owner shall provide full information regarding
his requirements for the Project
2.2 The Owner shall designate, when necessary, a representative authorized to act in his behalf with respect to
the Project. The Owner or his representative shall examine documents submitted by the Architect and shall
render decisions pertaining thereto promptly, to avoid
unreasonable delay in the progress of the Architect's work.
2 3 The Owner shall furnish a certified land survey of the
site giving, as applicable, grades and lines of streets, alleys,
pavements and adjoining property; rights-of-way, restrictions, easements, encroachments, zoning, deed restrictions,
boundaries and contours of the site; locations, dimensions
and complete data pertaining to existing buildings, other
improvements and trees; and full information concerning
available service and utility lines both public and private,
above and below grade, including inverts and depths.
2.4 The Owner shall furnish the services of a soils engineer or other consultant when such services are deemed
necessary by the Architect, including reports, test borings,
test pits, soil bearing values, percolation tests, air and
water pollution tests, ground corrosion and resistivity tests
and other necessary operations for determining subsoil,
air and water conditions, with appropriate professional
interpretations thereof.
2.5 The Owner shall furnish structural, mechanical,
chemical and other laboratory tests, inspections and reports
as required by law or the Contract Documents.
2.6 The Owner shall furnish such legal, accounting, and
insurance counselling services as may be necessary for the
Project, and such auditing services as he may require to

ascertain how or for what purposes the Contractor has
used the moneys paid to him under the Construction
Contract.
2.7 The services, information, surveys and reports required by Paragraphs 2.3 through 2.6 inclusive shall be
furnished at the Owner's expense, and the Architect shall
be entitled to rely upon the accuracy and completeness
thereof.
2.8 If the Owner observes or otherwise becomes aware
of any fault or defect in the Project or non-conformance
with the Contract Documents, he shall give prompt written notice thereof to the Architect.
2.9 The Owner shall furnish information required of him
as expeditiously as necessary for the orderly progress of
the Work,

ARTICLE 3
CONSTRUCTION COST
3.1 The Construction Cost to be used as the basis for
determining the Architect's Basic Compensation shall be
the total cost or estimated cost to the Owner of all Work
designed or specified by the Architect, which shall be
determined as follows, with precedence in the order
listed:
3.1.1 For completed construction, the total cost of all
such Work;
3.1.2 For Work not constructed, (1) the lowest bona fide
bid received from a qualified bidder for any or all of such
Work, or (2) if the Work is not bid, the bona fide negotiated proposal submitted for any or all of such Work; or
3.13 For Work for which no such bid or proposal is
received, (1) the latest Detailed Estimate of Construction
Cost if one is available, or (2) the latest Statement of
Probable Construction Cost
3.2 Construction Cost does not include the compensation of the Architect and consultants, the cost of the land,
rights-of-way, or other costs which are the responsibility
of the Owner as provided in Paragraphs 2.3 through 2.6
inclusive.
3 3 Labor furnished by the Owner for the Project shall
be included in the Construction Cost at current market
rates including a reasonable allowance ior overhead and
profit. Materials and equipment furnished by the Owner
shall be included at current market prices, except that
used materials and equipment shall be included as if purchased new for the Project.
3.4 Statements of Probable Construction Cost and Detailed Cost Estimates prepared by the Architect represent
his best judgment as a design professional familiar with
the construction industry. It is recognized, however, that
neither the Architect nor the Owner has any control over
the cost of labor, materials or equipment, over the contractors' methods of determining bid prices, or over competitive bidding or market conditions. Accordingly, the
Architect cannot and does not guarantee that bids will not
vary from any Statement of Probable Construction Cost
or other cost estimate prepared by him.
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3.5 When a fixed limit of Construction Cost is established as a condition of this Agreement, it shall include a
bidding contingency of ten percent unless another amount
is agreed upon in writing. When such a fixed limit is established, the Architect shall be permitted to determine what
materials, equipment, component systems and types of
construction are to be included in the Contract Documents, and to make reasonable adjustments in the scope
of the Project to bring it within the fixed limit. The Architect may also include in the Contract Documents alternate
bids to adjust the Construction Cost to the fixed limit

5.1.2 Expense of reproductions, postage and handling
of Drawings and Specifications excluding duplicate sets
at the completion of each Phase for the Owner's review
and approval.
5.1.3 If authorized in advance by the Owner, expense
of overtime work requiring higher than regular rates and
expense of renderings or models for the Owner's use.
5.1.4 Expense of computer time when used in connection with Additional Services.

3.5.1 If the lowest bona fide bid or negotiated proposal, the Detailed Cost Estimate or the Statement of
Probable Construction Cost exceeds such fixed limit of
Construction Cost (including the bidding contingency)
established as a condition of this Agreement, the Owner
shall (1) give written approval of an increase in such fixed
limit, (2) authorize rebidding the Project within a reasonable time, or (3) cooperate in revising the Project scope
and quality as required to reduce the Probable Construction Cost. In the case of (3) the Architect, without additional charge, shall modify the Drawings and Specifications
as necessary to bring the Construction Cost within the
fixed limit. The providing of such service shall be the
limit of the Architects responsibility in this regard, and
having done so, the Architect shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with this Agreement

ARTICLE 6

ARTICLE 4
DIRECT PERSONNEL EXPENSE
4.1 Direct Personnel Expense of employees engaged on
the Project by the Architect includes architects, engineers,
designers, job captains, draftsmen, specification writers
and typists, in consultation, research and design, in producing Drawings, Specifications and other documents pertaining to the Project, and in services during construction
at the site.
4.2
and
tory
and

Direct Personnel Expense includes cost of salaries
of mandatory and customary benefits such as statuemployee benefits, insurance, sick leave, holidays
vacations, pensions and similar benefits.

ARTICLE 5
REIMBURSABLE EXPENSES
5.1 Reimbursable Expenses are in addition to the Compensation for Basic and Additional Services and include
actual expenditures made by the Architect, his employees,
or his professional consultants in the interest of the Project for the expenses listed in the following Subparagraphs:
5.1.1 Expense of transportation and living when traveling in connection with the Project; long distance calls
and telegrams; and fees paid for securing approval of
authorities having jurisdiction over the Project

6

PAYMENTS TO THE ARCHITECT
6.1 Payments on account of the Architect's Basic Services shall be made as follows:
6.1.1 An initial payment as set forth in Paragraph Ila
(Page 2) is the minimum payment under this Agreement
6.1.2 Subsequent payments for Basic Services shall be
made monthly in proportion to services performed so
that the compensation at the completion of each Phase
shall equal the following percentages of the total Basic
Compensation:
Schematic Design Phase
15%
Design Development Phase
35%
Construction Documents Phase . . . . 75%
Bidding or Negotiation Phase
80%
Construction Phase
100%
6.2 Payments for Additional Services of the Architect as
defined in Paragraph 1.3, and for Reimbursable Expenses
as defined in Article 5, shall be made monthly upon
presentation of the Architect's statement of services rendered.
6.3 No deductions shall be made from the Architect's
compensation on account of penalty, liquidated damages, or other sums withheld from payments to contractors.
6.4 If the Project is suspended for more than three
months or abandoned in whole or in part, the Architect
shall be paid his compensation for services performed
prior to receipt of written notice from the Owner of such
suspension or abandonment, together with Reimbursable
Expenses then due and all terminal expenses resulting
from such suspension or abandonment If the Project is
resumed after being suspended for more than three
months, the Architect's compensation shall be subject to
renegotiation.
6.5 Payments due the Architect under this Agreement
shall bear interest at the legal rate commencing sixty
days after the date of billing.

ARTICLE 7
ARCHITECT'S ACCOUNTING RECORDS
Records of the Architect's Direct Personnel, Consultant
and Reimbursable Expenses pertaining to the Project
shall be kept on a generally recognized accounting basis
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and shall be available to the Owner or his authorized
representative at mutually convenient times.

ARTICLE 11
ARBITRATION

ARTICLE 8
TERMINATION OF AGREEMENT
This Agreement may be terminated by either party upon
seven days' written notice should the other party fail
substantially to perform in accordance with its terms
through no fault of the other. In the event of termination
due to the fault of others than the Architect, the Architect shall be paid his compensation for services performed to termination date, including Reimbursable Expenses then due and all terminal expenses.

ARTICLE 9
OWNERSHIP OF DOCUMENTS
Drawings and Specifications as instruments of service
are and shall remain the property of the Architect whether
the Project for which they are made is executed or not.
They are not to be used by the Owner on other projects
or extensions to this Project except by agreement in writing and with appropriate compensation to the Architect.

ARTICLE 10
SUCCESSORS A N D ASSIGNS
The Owner and the Architect each binds himself, his
partners, successors, assigns and legal representatives to
the other party to this Agreement and to the partners,
successors, assigns and legal representatives of such other
party with respect to all covenants of this Agreement.
Neither the Owner nor the Architect shall assign, sublet
or transfer his interest in this Agreement without the
written consent of the other.

11.1 All claims, disputes and other matters in question
arising out of, or relating to, this Agreement or the
breach thereof shall be decided by arbitration in accordance with the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of
the American Arbitration Association then obtaining unless the parties mutually agree otherwise. This agreement
to arbitrate shall be specifically enforceable under the
prevailing arbitration law.
11.2 Notice of the demand for arbitration shall be filed
in writing with the other party to this Agreement and
with the American Arbitration Association. The demand
shall be made within a reasonable time after the claim,
dispute or other matter in question has arisen. In no
event shall the demand for arbitration be made after the
date when institution of legal or equitable proceedings
based on such claim, dispute or other matter in question
would be barred by thg applicable statute of limitations.
113
The award rendered by the arbitrators shall be final,
and judgment may be entered upon it in accordance with
applicable law in any court having jurisdiction thereof.
ARTICLE 12
EXTENT OF AGREEMENT
This Agreement represents the entire and integrated
agreement between the Owner and the Architect and
supersedes all prior negotiations, representations or
agreements, either written or oral. This Agreement may
be amended only by written instrument signed by both
Owner and Architect.
ARTICLE 13
GOVERNING LAW
Unless otherwise specified, this Agreement shall be governed by the law of the principal place of business of the
Architect
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This Agreement executed the day and year first written above.

ARCHITECT

OWNER

THE CARBON COUNTY COMMISSION
FOR CARBON COUNTY

EHLERS AND EHLERS ARCHITECTS, INCORPORATED

£^^a*£fAdw
February 15, 1978

A. Jack Ehlers
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JOHN E. SCHINDLER
Chief Deputy County Attorney
120 East Main
Price, Utah 84501
(801) 637-4700
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
EHLERS & EHLERS ARCHITECTS,
INC.,

NOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
CARBON COUNTY, A Public
Corporation,

Civil No. 15514

Defendant.

COMES NOW the Defendant, pursuant to Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure and moves the Court for Summary Judgment herein.

As grounds

therefore Defendant states that there are no material issues of facts and
defendant is entitled to Judgment as a matter of law. Said Motion is based on
Affidavits of NORMAN PRICHARD and TIM SIMMONS attached hereto, and the
Deposition of JACK EHLERS on file herein. A Memorandum in Support of this
Motion is submitted herewith.
DATED this // day of September, 1989.

Mnf SrLM.

JOHN/E. SCHINDLER
Chief Deputy County Attorney
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing, Motion for Summary Judgment, postage prepaid, on this
September, 1989, to:

'/

day of

Earl S. Spafford and L. Charles Spafford, SPAFFORD St

SPAFFORD, 311 South State Street, Suite 380, Salt Lake City, Utah, 34111.

MADALENE C. WILLIAMS, Secretary

JOHN E. SCHINDLER
Chief Deputy County Attorney
120 East Main
P r i c e , Utah 84501
(801) 637-4700
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY
SrATE OF UTAH
EHLER3 & EHLERS ARCHITECTS,
INC.,
vs.

)
)
;)

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

CARBON COUNTY, A Public
Corporation,

\
]i

Civil No. 15614

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

]

INTRODUCTION
Late in 1977, the Carbon County Commission proposed the construction
of the Criminal J u s t i c e Center.

To t h a t end, an a r c h i t e c t , the P l a i n t i f f

herein, was contacted to move the project to a bond issue and hopefully,

to

complete construction.
EHLERS AND EHLERS ARCHITECTS, Incorporated, executed a contract dated
February 1, 1978.

The project proceeded through the i n i t i a l stages of design

and design development.
The P l a i n t i f f completed drawings necessary for the bond e l e c t i o n .
These drawings were presented by l e t t e r of February 27- 1981, from P l a i n t i f f to
the Carbon County Commission. The bond issue was presented to the voters of
Caroon County. A canvas of t h a t e l e c t i o n was made on June 15, 1981. The vote
was 304 in favor and 1399 a g a i n s t .
In February, 1985, a building board was formed to proceed with the Tri
Court Complex to house the Carbon County f a c i l i t y for the D i s t r i c t , Juvenile
and C i r c u i t Courts.
The P l a i n t i f f i n i t i a t e d t h i s action in October, 1986, alleging a
breach of c o n t r a c t .

I t i s the P l a i n t i f f ' s position t h a t the Tri-Court Complex

project i s a continuation of the Criminal J u s t i c e Center project and that his

contract of February 1, 1973, requires the Defendant to continue P l a i n t i f f 1 s
services for the Tri-Court Complex p r o j e c t .

As t h i s was not done, P l a i n t i f f

argues, Defendant has breached i t s February 1, 1978, contract and P l a i n t i f f

is

e n t i t l e d to damages.
Defendant submits, by t h i s Motion for Summary Judgmant, t h a t the
Criminal J u s t i c e Center project ceased wten t t e bond issue f a i l e d ,

that

P l a i n t i f f was fully paid for his services concerning that project and the T r i Court Complex i s not a continuation of the Criminal J u s t i c e Center project.
Defendant, therefore, i s e n t i t l e d to a dismissal of P l a i n t i f f ' s Complaint.
UNDISPUTED FACTS
P l a i n t i f f and Defendant entered into a contract e n t i t l e d Standard Form
of Agreement Between Owner and Architect.

Tha contract which P l a i n t i f f a s s e r t s

as i t s basis for i t s claim i s dated February 1, 1973, and i s attached to the
Deposition of MR. JACK EHLERS of EHLERS AMD EHLERS ARCHITECTS, Incorporated, as
Deposition Exhibit 1.

The contract designates the project as the Carbon County

Criminal J u s t i c e Center.

The Carbon County Criminal J u s t i c e Center was to

include court f a c i l i t i e s , remodeling of the j a i l and commission chambers.
(EHLERS1 Deposition, page 192.)
The P l a i n t i f f provided services through the schematic design phase and
the design development phase of the Carbon County Criminal J u s t i c e Center
project.

(See paragraphs 1.1.1 and 1.1.4 of Article 1 of the contract -

EHLERS1 Deposition, Exhibit 1.)
The development drawings were presented to the Carbon County
Commission by l e t t e r dated February 27, 1981, from P l a i n t i f f and Defendant.
(EHLERS1 Deposition, Exhibit 8 ) .

The Carbon County Criminal J u s t i c e Center

project went to e l e c t i o n on the bond issue question in 1981.

The bond issue

failed (See Affidavit of NORMAN PRICHARD and attachments t h e r e t o . )
The project known as the Carbon County Criminal J u s t i c e Center
provided for court f a c i l i t i e s , a remodeling and expanison of the j a i l and
commission chambers.

(See PRICHARD Affidavit and EHLERS1 Deposition, page

19-)
Defendant's position i s t h a t upon the f a i l u r e of the bond issue the
Carbon County Criminal J u s t i c e Center project terminated.
Affidavit.)
1

(PRICHARD

P l a i n t i f f was paid $56,000 for his services to t h a t p o i n t .

(EHLERS Deposition, pages 72-73 and PRICHARD Affidavit.)

P l a i n t i f f acknowledged t h a t he was aware t h a t the Carbon County
Criminal J u s t i c e Center project would not go forward unless the bond issue in
1981 passed.

(EHLERS1 Deposition, page 58, line 22 to line 3, page 59; page

79, line 21 to line 6, p3ge 80.)
Notwithstanding, the f a i l u r e of the bond issue for the Carbon County
Criminal J u s t i c e Center project, i t i s the P l a i n t i f f ' s position t h a t the T r i Court Complex i s a continuation of the project known as the Carbon County
Criminal J u s t i c e Center.

(EHLERS1 Deposition, page 76, line 11 to line 16.)

The project to construct the Tri-Court Complex was begun in 1985.
(PRICHARD Affidavit.)

This project contained f a c i l i t i e s for the D i s t r i c t ,

Juvenile and C i r c u i t Courts of what i s now know as the Seventh J u d i c i a l
D i s t r i c t s i t t i n g in P r i c e , Carbon County, Utah.

I t includes court rooms and

support c l e r i c a l f a c i l i t i e s (SIMMONS Affidavit.)

The services of P l a i n t i f f

were not u t i l i z e d for the Tri-Court Complex p r o j e c t .
ARGUMENT

Defendant's argument can be succinctly stated as follows:
1. P l a i n t i f f ' s claim i s based on his position t h a t the Tri-Court
Complex project i s a continuation of the Carbon County Criminal J u s t i c e Center
project.

(EHLERS1 Deposition, page 76, l i n e s 11-16.)
2.

Tha Carbon County Criminal J u s t i c e Center project i s not the same

as the Tri-Court Complex p r o j e c t .
3 . Therefore, P l a i n t i f f ' s Complaint should be dismissed.
The Carbon County Criminal J u s t i c e Center project was an e f f o r t to
have an integrated u n i t encompassing commission chambers, j a i l and d i s t r i c t
court room f a c i l i t i e s as an extension to the e x i s t i n g courthouse in P r i c e . The
Tri-Court Complex houses only the three courts and t h e i r support c l e r i c a l
s t a f f , including clerks o f f i c e s . Ttere are no j a i l f a c i l i t i e s nor was i t ever
considered t h a t the Carbon County Commission u t i l i z e the Tri-Court Complex
f a c i l i t y . (SIMMONS Affidavit.)
JACK EHLERS, the principal of EHLERS AND EHLERS ARCHITECTS,
Incorporated, acknowledged his understanding t h a t the Carbon County Criminal
J u s t i c e Center project would not proceed unless the bond issue therefore was
successful. MR. EHLERS t e s t i f i e d :
"QUESTION:
Were you aware a t that time t h a t the project
wouldn't go forward unless the bond issue passed?

ANSWER:
At that time I was aware t h a t i t would not go a t
t h a t time, but I was always told and aware that a t some time
i t would move on; therefore, I would keep dropping in as I
went to Moab or to Emery or whatever j u s t to touch base with
the commissioners." (EHLERS1 Deposition, page 58, line 22
to page 59, line 3;
n

IHE WITNESS: I agreed, and i t ! s in your minutes and i t ' s
in my l e t t e r , t h a t if the project was dead, instead of the
amount due, $76,898.08, which was a l l due with the
submission of these drawing, I would accept in full payment
$56,000. Again, I was trying to save the county knowing of
t h e i r funds condition.
QUESTION:
proceed?
ANSWER:
QUESTION:
ANSWER:
QUESTION:

(By Mr. Schindler)

If t t e project did not

Had died, then I would have accepted

~

$56,000?
$56,000.
And l e t i t go?

ANSWER: And l e t i t go."
20 to page 80, line 6.)

(EHLERS1 Deposition, page 79, line

P l a i n t i f f acknowledges agreeing to payment of $56,000 for the services
he performed on the two phases of t t e contract which were concluded.

(EHLERS*

Deposition, page 31, line 7; page 38, line 6 to page 39, line 1; page 79, line
20 to page 80, line 6.)

(See a l s o PRICHARD Affidavit and minutes attached.)

P l a i n t i f f knew his services would not be necessary if the bond issue f a i l e d .
(EHLERS1 Deposition, page 58, line 22 to page 59, line 3; page 24, lines 1223.)

P l a i n t i f f , therefore, received compensation, a t an amount to which he

agreed, for the services he rendered from February, 1978 to June, 1981,
concerning the Carbon County Criminal J u s t i c e Center p r o j e c t .
P l a i n t i f f ' s claim i s based on his contention t h a t t t e Carbon County
Criminal J u s t i c e Center and t t e Tri-Court Compolex projects are t t e same.
(EHLERS1 Deposition, page 76, l i n e s 11-16.)

Material submitted in support of

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment e s t a b l i s h e s these projects are two
separate and d i s t i n c t p r o j e c t s .
undisputed f a c t s as presented.

Defendant i s e n t i t l e d to Judgment on t t e

CONCLUSION

Tte two projects - the Carbon County Criminal Justice Center and the Tri-Court
Complex - are not the same projects. This fact has been establisted by the
Affidavits submitted in support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Defendant submits that Plaintiff's Complaint, as a matter of law, should be
dismissed.
DATED this / / day of September, 1989.

JOHN/B. SCHINDLER
Chier Deputy County Attorney
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing, Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment,
postage prepaid, on this / / day of September, 1989, to: Earl S. Spafford and
I . Charles Spafford, SPAFFORD & SPAFFORD, 311 South State Street, Suite 330,
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111.
t,

MADALENE C. WILLIAMS, Secretary

JOHN E. SCHINDLER
Chief Deputy County Attorney
120 East Main

Price, Utah 84501
(801) 637-4700
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
EHLERS & EHLER3 ARCHITECTS,
INC.,
Plaintiff,

,
I
]

AFFIDAVIT OF TIM SIMMONS

vs.
CARBON COUNTY, A Public
Corporation,
Defendant.
)
•
COUNTY OF CARBON j

)
]i

Civil No. 15614

]

STATS OF UTAH

ss

CQM£3 NOW TIM SIMMONS and being duly sworn upon his oath, deposes and
s t a t e s as follows:

1. Affiant is the Court Administrator for the Seventh Judicial
District Court in and for Carbon County, State of Utah.
2. As Court Administrator Affiant is familiar with tte court facility
which houses t t e Seventh District, Juvenile and Circuit Courts in and for
Carobn County, located in Price, Utah. Affiant was involved in tte abovereferenced project which came to be known as tte Tri-Court Complex project from
i t s inception.
3. The Tri-Court Complex facility was never intended to, nor were
plans discussed to, house f a c i l i t i e s for the Carbon County Commission or the
Carbon County j a i l .
4. The Tri-Court Complex nev2V included plans to house f a c i l i t i e s for
t t e Carbon County Commission.
5. The Tri-Court Complex was never intended to be an extension of tte
existing Carbon County Courthouse. Said facility was to be an independent
facility to house tte three courts as hereinafter indicated.
6. Tte present facility known as tte Tri-Court Complex includes
three court rooms, one each for tte District Court, Juvenile Court and Circuit
Court. In addition, said Complex includes judges chambers for each judge of

the above-referenced courts, secretarial and clerical staff f a c i l i t i e s and
offices for the clerks of each respective court. Also, with reference to the
Juvenile Court tte Tri-Court Complex includes office space for the probation
officers who function, as required by statute, in conjunction with said
Juvenile Court.
Furtter Affiant sayeth not.
DATED this / ^ d a y of September, 1989.

L<^l/l*^+C&7<*&

tM SIMMONS
Subscribed and sworn /TO before rre this

ffi|fv

day of September, 1989.

NOTARY PUBLIC

Residing at -r\ ir : I JlAk
My Commission Expires:
fl\,x. J jQl

JOHN E. SCHINDLER

Chief Deputy County Attorney
120 East Main
Price, Utan 84501
(801) 537-4700
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTS
STATE OF UTAH
EHLERS & EHLERS ARCHITECTS,

]

INC.,

;

Plaintiff,

i
]

AFFIDAVIT OF NORMAN PRICHARD

vs.
CARBON COUNTY, A Public
Corporation,
Dsfendant.
STATE OF UTAH

)
]•

Civil No. 15514

]

)
I

SS.

COUNTY OF CARBON )
GOMES NOW NORMAL PRICHARD and being duly sworn upon his oath, deposes
and states, as follows:
1.

Affiant is the Carbon County Clerk/Auditor.

Affiant has held the

office of the Carbon County Clerk/Auditor since October 1, 1977.
2.

That Affiant has reviewed the records of Carbon County, State of

Utah, with reference to the attachments to this Affidavit,
3. Affiant held the above-referenced office during the operative
period of tin**, that period being February 1, 1978, through Jane, 1981.
4. Affiant has attached hereto true and correct copies of the minutes
of the Carbon County Commission concerning the Carbon County Criminal Justice
Center with reference to Commission meetings on the following dates:
a.

November 14, 1977.

b. May 3, 1978.

c.
d.
e.
f.
g.

November 1, 1978.
October 22, 1980.
December 15, 1980.
April 8, 1981.
June 15, 1981.

5. Tte records of Carbon County indicate payment to EHLERS AMD EHLERS
ARCHITECT, Inc., in the sum of $56,000.00.
rte Carbon County Criminal Justice Center project included f a c i l i t i e s
for the District Court, commission chambers and an expanded and remodeled j a i l
facility all to be a part of the existing Carbon County Courthouse.
6. Tte Tri-Court Complex project began in 1983. Said project was
Initiated to contain courtrooms and supporting clerical and clerk f a c i l i t i e s
for tte District Court, Juvenile Court and Circuit Court s i t t i n g in Price,
Carbon County, State of Utah. Said project did not contain provision for any
other facility and was intended solely to house tte three aforerrantioned
courts.
7. Affiant was present during several discussions involving JACK
EKLERS, on behalf of EHLERS AND EHLERS ARCHITECTS, Inc., and tne Carbon County
Commission. Tte County Commission indicated to MR. EHLERS, from tte cutset,
that tte Carbon County Criminal Justice Center project could not procoad unless
tte bond issue passed.
8. Tte project was presented to tte public for a bond issue, Tte
project was rejected by a vote of 304 in favor and 1399 against. Ttesa results
were certified by tte commission on June 15, 1981.
Further Affiant sayeth not.
DATED this ^
day of September, 1989.

n7h

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

j
.1

day of September, 1989.
'

NOTARY PUBLIC

Residing at

fad<

My Commission Expires':

/^/J^tf/.$/

J i/'O
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L. CHARLES SPAFFORD (4416)
CHASE KIMBALL (4993)
SPAFFORD & SPAFFORD
A Professional Corporation
425 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-1234
Attorneys for Plaintiff
I

IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY

11

STATE OF UTAH

i

*

*

!] EHLERS & EHLERS ARCHITECTS,
' a Utah corporation,
l|
l|
Plaintiff,
j|
I

*

*

*
*
*

RESPONSE MEMORANDUM TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

VS .

I CARBON COUNTY,
|! A public corporation,

*

Civil No. 15614

!'

*

1

Judge Boyd Bunnell
Defendant.

i

I'

*

ji

*

*

*

COMES NOW THE PLAINTIFF, who hereby submits this Response

j Memorandum to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
I
j

BACKGROUND FACTS
Plaintiff does not presently dispute the Undisputed Facts
section of defendant's brief, with some important exceptions.
1.

The unnumbered sixth paragraph under the UNDISPUTED

FACTS section of defendant's brief states:

"Plaintiff

acknowledged that he was aware that the Carbon County Criminal
Justice Center project would not go forward unless the bond issue
In 1981 passed."
:o say:
r

However, in the deposition Mr. Ehlers goes on

"I was aware that it would not go at that time, but I

as always told and aware that at some time it would move on:

therefore, I would keep dropping in...just to touch base with the
commissioners."

EHLERS' Deposition, page 58 line 24 through page

59 line 3.
2.

The unnumbered seventh paragraph under the UNDISPUTED

FACTS section states that it is plaintiff's position that the
Tri-Court Complex is a continuation of the Carbon County Criminal
Justice Center.

That is true, but plaintiff is not claiming that

the projects were identical, and presumably defendant is not
prepared to argue that the two projects did not in fact have a
great deal in common.
3.

The above quote from Ehlers' deposition, and other

| statements from Mr. Semken found on page 61 of the deposition
i
| and quoted in detail below raise the issue of whether a contract
; was revived or existed between the parties in the instant action.
j

ARGUMENT

i

DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT REVIVED THE CONTRACT
As noted above, Ehlers was aware that his contract depended
upon the bond issue that failed.

However, he was led to believe

that the contract would be revived if and when the project went
forward, as discussed supra.

Ehlers further discusses how Mr.

Semken of the Carbon County Commission called him on 8 January
1985 to tell him the project had been revived, and he states:
"It was a telephone call and, well, I hung up the
phone, and the courthouse is a go is word for word,
yes. Then he said he'd like to see me on Tuesday at
8:00, and then he went on to discuss, and I didn't
write this in, that it was a very important thing that
we get it done immediately and asked me if I could
handle a time schedule of around six weeks, and I said
you bet, and he said get the wheels rolling so I did."

EHLERS' Deposition, page 61 lines 17 through 23.
Ehlers acted upon the direction of Semken, and he states
that he went to considerable expense to get ready for the
project, including doubling the size of his office, hiring new
personnel, contacting engineering firms and telling them to put
aside other projects to help him, and in general went to a great
deal of time and effort.
through 7.

See EHLERS7 Deposition page 6 2 lines 2

At the very least, plaintiff is entitled to reliance

damages, and this is a material issue that precludes summary
disposition.
A NEW CONTRACT WAS FORMED BETWEEN
PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT
As noted above, plaintiff was under the impression from the
county commissioners that if the project was revived he would be
given the contract.

Not only was the behavior of Semken enough

to revive the contract, but it had all the indicia of an
independent contract as well.
Semken called plaintiff and told him the courthouse project
was "a go", that he wanted to meet with him, that it had to be
done in six weeks, etc.

These statements are obviously an Offer

to contract from Semken.

Ehlers verbally accepted this offer,

and in addition detrimentally relied upon the offer.

Not only

are the classic elements of a contract present, but Semken, and
(through his authority and agency as a county commissioner), the
defendant as well are estopped to deny the contract pursuant to
the most basic legal principles.

The actions of Ehlers after the

offer, and the prior written documents are enough to satisfy any
3

statute of frauds difficulties.
This is another important legal issue that must be decided
at trialf and may not be summarily dismissed.
CONCLUSION
Wherefore, plaintiff prays that the summary judgment motion
of defendant be dismissed, as the above argument makes it very
plain that there are genuine issues of material fact that remain
in the instant action, and therefore summary judgment pursuant to
URCP 56 is inappropriate at this time.

Plaintiff further prays

for its costs and legal fees in having to respond to the motion
of defendant.
DATED this

day of October, 1989.
SPAFFORD & SPAFFORD, P.C.

ChasfeT Kimball
~
Attorney for Plaintiff

MAILING CERTIFICATE
The undersigned hereby certifies that he mailed a true copy
of the above document to John Schindler, 80 W. Main #201, Price,
UT 84501, on the date above.

£
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JOHN E. SCHINDLER
Chief Deputy County Attorney
120 East Main
P r i c e , Utah 84501
(801) 637-4700

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
EHLERS & EHLER3 ARCHITECTS,
INC.,

]

;

vs.

>
])
)I

DEFEND/INT'S REPLY MEMORANDUM
REGARDING DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

CARBON COUNTY, A Public
Corporation,

]
]I

Civil No. 15614

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

]
INTRODUCTION

p

l a i n t i f f has submitted a Response Memorandum concerning defendant's

Motion for Saunary Judgment.

Defendant submits t h i s Memorandum to Reply to t t e

argument advanced by P l a i n t i f f .
P l a i n t i f f does not take issue with t t e Undisputed Facts as presented
by Defendant in i t s Memorandum in Support.
ttese facts.
identical".

Plaintiff,

however, supplements

P l a i n t i f f s t a t e s he "is not claiming that t t e projects were
( P l a i n t i f f s Memorandum, paragraph 2, page 2 ) .

P l a i n t i f f also

argues t t e Defendant i s e n t i t l e d to damages e i t h e r under a tteory of
detrimental reliance or t t e defendant i s estopped to deny t t e existence of a
new c o n t r a c t .
ARGUMENT - POINT I
Defendant will examine P l a i n t i f f ' s arguments beginning with t t e
estoppel argument.

Tte case of Utah State University of Agriculture and

Applied Science v. Sutro and Co., 646 P2d 715 (Utah 1932) s t a t e s t t e general
rule concerning estoppel a g a i n s t a governmental e n t i t y .

Tte Court stated t t e

general rule t h a t an estoppel argurrvent i s not available against a governmental
entity.

There are times, however, when estoppel is available• These
exceptions are discussed by Justice Crockett, writing on behalf of the Court,
at page 719 of the Opinion, tfe need not address these exceptions because
Plaintiff, by his own testimony acknowledged the need to obtain a firm f!go
ahead" commitment from the Defendant when the Tri-Court Complex project began,
A review of the P l a i n t i f f ' s testimony from page 61 to 67 reveals that
Plaintiff cannot meet the elements of estoppel. In particular, Plaintiff's
statement on page 63 reveals precisely what Plaintiff was thinking after f i r s t
hearing that the Tri-Court Complex was to begin. Plaintiff testified, "...of
course, we were waiting for the final go ahead to s t a r t drawing." (EHLER31
Deposition, page 63, line 16-17).
This testimony indicates Plaintiff was aware he would need formal
approval and instruction to proceed from the Carbon County Commission.
To assert estoppel one must show a material misstatement of fact upon
which the party asserting the estoppel has relied. Coleman v. Coleman, 743
P2d 782 (Ut App. 1937) The Plaintiff ha3 shown neither. In fact, the
Plaintiff's testimony, as quoted above, indicates Plaintiff did not rely on
statements purportedly made by LEE SEMKEN, Carbon County Commission
Chairman.
Further, estoppel is based on an objective test - what would a
reasonable person conclude under the circumstances. Larson v. Wycoff, 624
P2d 1151 (Utah 1981). Is i t reasonable for Mr. EHLER3 to rely on one telephone
call from the chairman of a county commission to incur costs of 64,000 plus
dollars on a project which will cost many thousands of dollars? Defendant
submits not.
Therefore, the estoppel argument advanced by Plaintiff is not viable.
POINT II
Plaintiff argues he relied on the statement by Commissioner SEMKEN,
incurred costs therefrom and is, therefore, entitled to reliance damages.
This argument also lacks merit.

Defendant will accept as true the testimony of Plaintiff concerning these
purported statements of LEE SEMKEN. Defendant does not intend to imply, nor
does Defendant concede that these statements were made by Commission SEMKEN.
In fact, Defendant believes Commissioner SEMKEN!s testimony at trial will be
the ooDosite.

Utah Code Annotated, Section 17-5-5, 1987, in p a r t , s t a t e s , "Not less
than two members (of the County Commission) s h a l l c o n s t i t u t e a quorum for the
transaction of business, and no a c t of the board s h a l l be valid or binding
unless two members concur t h e r e i n . "
Tte P l a i n t i f f had a history of extensive involvement with governmental
entites.

(See Ehlers' Deposition, page 9, lines 15-25).
P l a i n t i f f was aware he would need Commission approval to proceed with

tte project.

That i s why Mr. EHLERS, without s o l i c i t a t i o n and not in response

to a d i r e c t question, s t a t e d , a t page 63 of his Deposition, " . . . o f course, we
were waiting for the final go ahead to s t a r t drawing."
Pursuant to Utah Coda Annotated, Section 17-5-5, 1937, two members of
the Commission must concur to c o n s t i t u t e a valid and binding a c t of t t e
Commission.

P l a i n t i f f does not submit to t t e Court any fact supporting his

argument of detrimental r e l i a n c e .

Tte P l a i n t i f f has not because te cannot.

Tte P l a i n t i f f Knew he mast obtain " t t e final go a t e i i " .

As t h i s approval was

riBvev given, P l a i n t i f f ' s argument of detrimental reliance must f a i l .
POINT I I I
Before concluding t h i s Reply we must discuss P l a i n t i f f ' s statement in
paragraph 2 of page 2 of his Response.
Defendant submitted t t e Affidavits of NOMAN PRICHARD and TIM SIMMONS
in support of i t s Motion for Summary Judgment.

P l a i n t i f f has submitted no

Affidavits or other material to supplement his Deposition testimony.

Tte

Affidavits of Mr. PRICHARD and Mr. SIMMONS, as well as t t e testimony of
Mr. EHLERS in his Deposition, s u b s t a n t i a t e t t e fact that t t e Carbon County
Criminal J u s t i c e Center and t t e Tri-Court Complex are separate and d i s t i n c t
projects.
Contrary to tte P l a i n t i f f f s a s s e r t i o n in paragraph 2 of page 2 of his
Response, t t e Defendant does argue that these two projects did not have a great
deal in common.

Tte Carbon County Criminal J u s t i c e Center project included

f a c i l i t i e s for the D i s t r i c t Court, Commission Chambers and j a i l .

(See PRICHARD

Affidavit, paragraph 5 and EHLERS Deposition, page 19, lines 13-19).

Tte T r i -

Court Complex project was s p e c i f i c a l l y for t t e three courts of what i s now t t e
Seventh J u d i c i a l Court.

Tte difference i s extensive.

Tte Carbon County

Criminal J u s t i c e Center project considered only one court room wtereas t t e T r i Court Complex project involved three court rooms.

Tte Carbon County Criminal

Justice Center project did not consider support staff for the three courts as
did the Tri-Court Complex project. The Carbon County Criminal Justice Center
project made provision for cormission chambers and j a i l - these f a c i l i t i e s
were never a part of the Tri-Court Complex. The Tri-Court Complex was intended
as an independent facility not as a reoodel and add-on as was the plan for the
Carbon County Criminal Justice Center project.
Therefore, the project which involved the Plaintiff (the Carbon County
Criminal Justice Center project) was not revived; nor was i t resurrected with
minor changes as argued by the Plaintiff.
If the P l a i n t i f f ' s position herein were accurate Carbon County would
be required to hire the Plaintiff when the Commission Chamber was redone as a
Commission Chamber was part of his project; Carbon County would be required to
hire the Plaintiff if a j a i l were constructed as this was part of his project.
Plaintiff made no claim against Carbon County when the old District Court room
was redone for a new Commission Chamber.
Defendant submits the P l a i n t i f f ' s position is incongruous and lac*s
legal basis. Defendant testified, as previously indicated, he considered the
project concluded upon payment of the $56,000 and the failure of the bond
issue.
CONCLUSION

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted. The
Plaintiff knew the extent of his involvement concerning the Carbon County
Criminal Justice Center project. The Plaintiff testified, f,I was paid the
$56,000 up to the time of putting the job out for bond issue, and had the
project stopped then we were square." (EHLERS* Deposition, page 34, line 2022). Again, Plaintiff testified,
"ANSWER: I agreed to take $56,000.

I'm always a softie.

QUESTION: With the understanding that if the project
proceeded then you would be paid more and in accordance with
the contract?
ANSWER: That is correct. And I stopped by
to time when I was on the way to other work
was going, see if anything had happened. I
touch." (EHLERS* Deposition, page 39, line

here from tire
to see how i t
stayed in
1-7).

The undisputed facts are that the Plaintiff was paid for the services

he performed for the Defendant concerning the Carbon County Criminal Justice
Center project; that the Carbon County Criminal Justice Center project
terminated whan the bond issue failed; and that the Tri-Court Complex project
was not a continuation of the Carbon County Criminal Justice Center project.
Based on these undisputed facts the Defendant is entitled to Judgment.
DATED this ^ 7 day of
Ls'cj
1939.

JOriOf 5 / SCHINDLER
Chief 'Deputy County Attorney
CSRHFICAT5 OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I nailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Defendant's Reply Memorandum Regarding Defendant's Motion for "ji'sazj
Judgment, postage prepaid, on this ' \
day of / ( ^ / / t V ;
, 1939, to: Chase
Kimball, SPAFFORD & SPAFFORD, 425 East 100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 34111.

MADALENE C. WILLIAMS, Secretary
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
EHLERS & EHLERS ARCHITECTS,
INC.
Plaintiff,
vs.

RULING ON MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)
1
1

CARBON COUNTY, a Public
corporation,
Defendant.

)1

Civil No. 15614

]

The defendant has moved the Court for summary
judgment and has submitted their Memorandum of Legal Points and
Authorities together with Affidavits.

The plaintiff has filed

its objection to the granting of the Motion,

The Court hereby

orders that the Deposition of Jack Ehlers be published for the
purpose of this ruling, and the Court has considered the
matters contained in that Deposition.
In its Memorandum, the plaintiff accepts the
undisputed facts as stated by the defendant in their Memorandum
except for two unimportant aspects.

Based upon those accepted

undisputed facts, and the Affidavit submitted, and the matters
contained in the Deposition of Mr. Ehler, the Court finds that
the Contract entered into by the plaintiff and the defendant on
February 1, 1978 covering the Carbon County Criminal Justice
Center was completely performed by the parties and was
terminated.

The Court further finds that the Tri-Court Complex
project begun in 1985 was a different and distinct project and
had no relationship to the 1978 Agreement entered into between
the parties.
The Court further finds that there exists no
enforceable agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant,
Carbon County Commission, that authorized the plaintiff to
proceed with any work relative to the Tri-Court Complex
project, and that, therefore, the plaintiff has no cause of
action against the defendant.
The Court grants the Motion for Summary Judgment for
and on behalf of the defendant and directs that the defendant
prepare a formal judgment in accordance with this ruling.
The defendant is further awarded its costs in this proceeding.
DATED this

/

j? day of November, 1989.

(2)

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed true and correct copies of
the foregoing

RULING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

by

depositing the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid,
to the following:
Earl S. Spafford
L. Charles Spafford
SPAFFORD & SPAFFORD
Attorneys at Law
311 South State Street, Suite 380
Salt Lake City, UT
84111
John E. Schindler
Chief Deputy County Attorney
Carbon County Courthouse
Price, UT
84603
DATED this

/^y^~

day of November, 1989

Secretary
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L. CHARLES SPAFFORD (4416)
CHASE KIMBALL (4993)
SPAFFORD & SPAFFORD
A Professional Corporation
425 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-1234
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY
I

STATE OF UTAH

\

*

*

|EHLERS & EHLERS ARCHITECTS,
ja Utah corporation,
|

*

* MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Plaintiff,

I
I

*

*
vs •

I

*

jCARBON COUNTY,
IA public corporation,
|
j
Defendant.

*

i
|

Civil No. 15614
Judge Boyd Bunnell
*
*

*

*

•

COMES NOW THE PLAINTIFF, and hereby requests the Court to
reconsider or alter its summary judgment against plaintiff,
pursuant to URCP 59(e).

Plaintiff requests this reconsideration

because a study of the cases relied upon by defendant suggests
they actually support plaintiff's position as well if not more
than that of defendant.
A memorandum in support of this motion is attached hereto.
DATED this

,S

day of November, 1989.
SPAFFORD & SPAFFORD, P.C.

Chase KimbalT
Attorney for Plaintiff

[L. CHARLES SPAFFORD (4416)
CHASE KIMBALL (4993)
SPAFFORD & SPAFFORD
A Professional Corporation
425 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 36 3-1234
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

EHLERS & EHLERS ARCHITECTS,
a Utah corporation,

*

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Plaintiff,
vs .
CARBON COUNTY,
A public corporation,

Civil No. 15614
Judge Boyd Bunnell

Defendant.

COMES NOW THE PLAINTIFF, and hereby respectfully submits
this Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Reconsideration.
BACKGROUND
Defendant brought a motion for summary judgment on this
matter, which was ruled on 1 November 1989.

This court held that

the original contract for the Carbon County Criminal Justice
Center was discharged by the performance of the parties, a
holding that is not disputed by either side.

However, plaintiff

takes exception to the holding of the court that there was no
relationship between said Justice Center and the Tri-Court
Complex, and further takes exception to the holding that there
was no enforceable agreement between the parties.

Finally,

plaintiff notes that the judgment did not directly address the
issue of reliance damages on the part of plaintiff.
ARGUMENT
DEFENDANT IS ESTOPPED TO DENY AN AGREEMENT EXISTED
The defendant is estopped to deny the contract between
itself and plaintiff, in spite of the assertions to the contrary
by defendant.

In its reply memorandum, defendant relies very

heavily on the case of Utah State University of Agriculture and
Applied Science v. Sutro and Co., 646 P.2d 715 (Utah 1982) to
support his assertions that an estoppel argument is not available
against defendant because it is a government entity.

While

defendant does note that there are exceptions to this general
rule, it claims that it need not address these exceptions.
Plaintiff strongly disagrees with defendant's assertions re
the estoppel exceptions.

In support of this, plaintiff notes

that the Sutro court held:
A decision which recognized that there are
sometimes circumstances where the interests of justice
demand allowing the doctrine of estoppel to be asserted
against the government was issued over 100 years ago by
the United States Supreme court in Hackett v. City of
Ottawa. There the city official had represented that
bonds were issued for a lawful purpose and issued them
under the city's seal, but it was later determined that
their issuance had not been in accordance with lawful
authority. It was held that because such obvious
unfairness would otherwise result to purchasers of the
bonds, the city was estopped from asserting that they
had been unlawfully issued and were void.
Another case which we regard as helpful and
representing sound reasoning on this subject is that of
United States v. Lazy FC Ranch. After reviewing the
case law, the court stated that estoppel should be
allowed as a defense against the government where to do
otherwise would work a serious injustice, and the
public interest would not be unduly damaged by the
n

interposition of that defense. In its discussion, the
court engaged in what has been referred to as a
"balancing of equities" test and concluded that under
the facts of that case a grave injustice would result
if the government were not held responsible for the
information it had given the Ranch and which the latter
had relied on; and that under the circumstances there
would be no serious adverse effect either on public
policy or the interest of the government by permitting
the Ranch partners to retain the funds they had
received.
In the later case of United States v. Wharton, the
court reiterated the standard set forth in Lazy FC
Ranch. The defendants asserted the government was
estopped by the affirmative misconduct on the part of
government officials who gave them incorrect
information. The court noted the precaution that not
every form of official misinformation would be
sufficient to estop the government, but where advice
given was so closely related to basic fairness and the
decision-making process, the government should be
estopped from disavowing the representation made
because to do so would work a serious injustice on the
defendant and the interest of the public would not be
unduly threatened or damaged.
Our own court has similarly long since taken its
position in accord with the doctrine just discussed, of
looking through the rigidity of a general rule to see
and apply and exception where it is plain that the
interest of justice so require. In the case of Wall v.
Salt Lake City, the city by affirmative acts and
representation had allowed the plaintiffs to take
possession of property which was difficult for the city
to utilize as a street. In reliance thereon, the
plaintiffs had possessed and cared for the property
for over 20 years. The court held that the city was
estopped from repudiating its representations and
reclaiming the property. The ruling in the Wall case
was restated with approval in the later case of Tooele
City v. Elkincrton, though the court was not persuaded
that the factual requirements for invoking estoppel
against the city were met.
We have recently had occasion to confront another
situation where egregious injury would result unless
estoppel was applied against a governmental
institution. In Celebrity Club v. Utah Liquor Control
Commission, the plaintiff club had made large
expenditures, relying on assurances of an official of
the Liquor Commission, which this court held could not
be repudiated to the injury of the club.
We regard the authorities referred to above as
well reasoned, with which our sense of justice is in
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harmony, and support of the well-recognized policy of
the law as earlier set forth herein, to be the effect
that the rule which precludes the assertion of estoppel
against the government is sound and generally should be
applied, except only in appropriate circumstances as
hereinabove stated, where the interests of justice
mandate an exception to that general rule. In cases
where such an issue arises, the critical inquiry is
whether it appears that the facts may be found with
such certainty, and the injustice to be suffered is of
sufficient gravity, to invoke the exception. And in
case there is doubt on such matters, it should be
resolved in favor of permitting the party to have a
trial of the issue, as opposed to summary rejections
thereof. Id. at 719-20. (emphasis added, citations
omitted.)
Upon review of this case, it is little wonder that defendant did
not wish to delve into the exceptions provided by the court.
Plaintiff's case fits very nicely into the exceptions.
I
j] First, the facts may be found with certainty, there are phone
i

|i records, diary entries, etc., which document the actions of the
i!

• I principals involved.

Second, plaintiff laid out approximately

r
ii

$64,000.00 in various costs in reliance upon the assertions of
defendant's agent, Semken.

Damages of $64,000.00 are substantial

by almost anybody's standards.
Defendant also relies heavily on UCA §17-5-5 to counter
plaintiff's estoppel argument, stating that Semken as an
individual did not have the power to bind the county.
two counter arguments to defendant's assertions.

There are

First, in the

Celebrity Club case discussed supra, the plaintiff relied upon
the assertions of only one official of the Utah Liquor
Commission, and said commission was estopped by the court.
Secondly, and far more important, plaintiff was by no means

relying upon only the unsupported words of Semken alone.

We find

in Ehlers deposition, p. 61 line 1 through 2 2 , that Semken called
Ehlers on 8 January 1985, told him the project was "a go," and
asked him if he could be ready in six weeks.

Obviously, on a

project of this size, six weeks is a very short time and
I plaintiff would have had to react immediately.

In addition,

j Semken asked Ehlers to meet him in his office on 15 January 1985,
J see deposition page 61 line 19. At this meeting, not only was
ij
11Semken present, but Floyd Marx and Guido Rachiele as w e l l , and

ij
'they met in the commission chambers, see deposition p. 62 lines
'I
t

|| 24-25. This meeting lasted for at least three hours, with
!
l Semken, who was the commission chairman, and Rachiele, who was

•j
I also a commissioner.

During this meeting the project was

,i discussed at some length.

See deposition p. 63 lines 11-17.

The

j fact that at least two commissioners were present at this meeting

ii
[takes this issue complete beyond the strictures of UCA §17-5-5 as
they relate to a quorum.
Plaintiff had a long meeting with at least two
commissioners, constituting a quorum pursuant to the above
statute, in the commission chambers.

During this meeting

pressure was put upon plaintiff to get the project done as
quickly as possible, and plaintiff relied upon these assertions
to his detriment.

This is estoppel, plain and simple.

If

plaintiff may not rely upon the assertions of two commissioners
speaking at a meeting in their official chambers, what may he
reasonably rely upon?

If he feels that the urgency of the
5

situation prevents him from getting all the details worked out
and signed on paper, does that prevent him from realizing his
reliance damages?

He may have wanted to wait for final go ahead

in order to start drawing, but presumably that was because he was
wary of any last minute changes from the board.

However,

concerns about minor last minute changes in the design would not
prevent a reasonably prudent individual from doing preliminary
work as Ehlers describes, that of hiring new staff, radically
changing his schedule, and other necessary actions.
Furthermore, as noted with emphasis supra, in cases where
estoppel is asserted against the government, the policy in Utah
is to allow a full trial on the merits, rather than summary
!disposition.
J

The plaintiff has shown a material misstatement of fact. As

[discussed supra, he had a phone call and held a long meeting with
a quorum of the county commission, during which the project was
planned and he was told he would be the architect.
fired by Rachiele.

Then he was

This is incontestably a material

misstatement, and therefore defendant's objections based on the
case of Coleman v. Coleman, 743 P.2d 782 (Utah App. 1987) are
met.
Defendant also states that plaintiff has failed to meet the
objective test, the reasonable man standard imposed by Larson v.
Wycoff, 624 P.2d 1151 (Utah 1981).

As note above, if a man can't

rely upon a meeting held in the commission chambers with a quorum
of the commission, what can he reasonably rely on?
6

Defendant's

assertion that plaintiff relied upon only one phone call is
demonstrably wrong.
Defendant spends a considerable amount of time in his reply
brief trying to prove the dissimilarity between the Tri-Court
Complex and the Justice Center.

Plaintiff agrees that the

projects are not identical, but they don't need to be identical
in order to show detrimental reliance upon the part of plaintiff.
Even if the Justice Center had never been planned by defendant
and designed by plaintiff, the actions of defendant in reference
to the Tri-Court Complex merit reliance damages for plaintiff.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff designed the Justice Center for defendant many
years ago.

When the bond issue failed and the Justice Center

needed to be scrapped, plaintiff was requested to keep in touch
and promised a shot at designing the successor project.

In 1985

plaintiff was approached by the defendant's commission and
requested to begin work immediately on a similar project, to be
completed in the shortest possible time.

Plaintiff met with a

quorum of the commission in the commission chambers and was told
the prepare for the project.
these orders.

Plaintiff reasonably relied upon

In order to react quickly enough to satisfy

defendant, plaintiff made numerous expensive changes to his
office and schedule, all to his detriment.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays that this court reconsider its
entry of judgment, and reopen this case that it might be tried on
the merits in accordance with the directives of the Utah Supreme
7

Court.
DATED this

7

/ N.

day of November, 1989
SPAFFORD & SPAFFORD, P.C.

Chase Kimball^
Attorney for Plaintiff

MAILING CERTIFICATE
The undersigned hereby certifies that he mailed a true copy
of the above document to John Schindler, 80 W. Main #201, Price,
UT 84501, on the date above.
/
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JOHN E. SCHINDLER
Chief Deputy County Attorney
120 East Main

Price, Utah 84501
(801) o37-4700
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUi.Tf
STATE OF UTAH
EHLERS & EHLERS ARCHITECTS,

;

INC.,

Plaintiff,

l

V5 •

,

CARBON COUNTY, A Public
Corporation,

]
]•

Defendant.

J U D G M E N T

]

Civil No. 15614

)

This natter having come before the Court on Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment and the Court having reviewed said Motion, t t e Memorandum
submitted by both parties, the Affidavits in support of said Motion, the
Deposition of JACK EHLERS and tte file herein, and further having submitted i t s
Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment now finds as follows:
1. That there are no material issues of fact and t t e Defendant is
entitled to Judgment as a matter of law.
2. That tte contract between tte parties dated February 1, 1973, was
completely performed and terminated.
3. That tte Tri-Court Complex, which began in 1935, was a different
and distinct project which had no relation to tte 1978 contract and tte subject
thereof.
4. As no agreement existed between tte Parties authorizing tte
Plaintiff to proceed with any work relative to tte Tri-Court Complex, tte
Plaintiff has no cause of action against tte Defendant.
5. That tte Defendant is entitled to Judgment dismissing P l a i n t i f f ' s
Complaint.
6. That tte Defendant is entitled to Judgment against tte Plaintiff
for i t s costs.
7. That Defendant has submitted a Memorandum of Costs indicating
costs in tte amount of $333.49.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND DECREED a s f o l l o w s :
1.

That P l a i n t i f f ' s Complaint be and i t i s hereby dismissed with

prejudice.
2.

That Defendant be awarded i t s costs in the amount of $333.49.

DATED t h i s

, / ^ d a y of November, 1989.
BY THE COURT:

;~H33YD BUNNELL/ D i s t r i c t 'Judge

C
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I nailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Judgment, postage prepaid, on this ,'5 day of November, 1939, to:
Cr&se Kimball, SPAFFORD & SPAFFORD, 425 East 100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah,
84111.

MADALENE C. WILLIAMS, Secretary

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
EHLERS & EHLERS ARCHITECTS, INC., )
a Utah corporation,
i

RULING ON MOTION
TO RECONSIDER

Plaintiff,
vs.
CARBON COUNTY, a Public
Corporation,

i

Civil No. 15614

Defendant.
The plaintiff has filed a motion to reconsider or
alter the summary judgment of the Court, and states that the
motion is being made pursuant to Rule 59(e).
denies the motion on several grounds.
judgment has been issued.

The Court hereby

First of all, no summary

The Court rendered its Memorandum

Decision, but has not formally entered a summary judgment and
there was none on file at the time of the filing of plaintiff's
motion.
The reliance on Rule 59(e) is misplaced since that
Rule only applies to judgments entered, and further, no grounds
have been specified other than to reargue matters already
considered.
Lastly, there is nothing in the plaintiff's
memorandum that would cause the Court to alter its opinion.

Since the plaintiff has filed no objection to the
Proposed Summary Judgment, as submitted by the defendant, the
Court has, on this day, signed the Summary Judgment as proposed
by the defendant.
DATED this

/S> ^ day of November, 1989.

page two

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed true and correct copies of
the foregoing

RULING ON MOTION TO RECONSIDER

by depositing

the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, to the
following:
Earl S. Spafford
L. Charles Spafford
SPAFFORD & SPAFFORD
Attorneys at Law
311 South State Street, Suite 380
Salt Lake City, UT
84111
John E. Schindler
Attorney at Law
First Interstate Bank Bldg.
80 West Main, Suite 201
Price, UT
84501
DATED t h i s

/Sltf^

da

Y of November, 1989.

page three

L. CHARLES SPAFFORD (4416)
CHASE KIMBALL (4993)
l SPAFFORD & SPAFFORD
|A Professional Corporation
• 425 East 100 South
;Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-1234
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

EHLERS & EHLERS ARCHITECTS,
a Utah corporation,

*

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiff,
vs.
CARBON COUNTY,
A public corporation,

Civil No. 15614
Judge Boyd Bunnell

Defendant.

COMES NOW THE PLAINTIFF, and hereby gives all parties notice
of its intent to appeal the ruling of the above-court granting
summary judgment to plaintiff, as well as the denial of its
Motion for Reconsideration of the summary judgment.
is pursuant to URCP 73 and RUSC 3 and 4.

This appeal

This appeal is within

the jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to UCA §78-22(3) (j), and shall therefore be the court appealed to.
DATED this

Q Q day of November, 1989.
Spafford & Spafford, P.C.
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bertion
17-5-76
17-5-77.
17-5-78.
17-579.
17-5-80.
17-5-80.5
17-5-81.

17-5-82.

17-5-83.
17-5-84
17-5-85.
17-5-80
17-5 87.
17-5-8^

COUNTIES
Water survey — Co-operation with Utah
Water Leers' Association, or subsidiary organization
Ordinances — Power to enact — Penalty
for violation
Establishing pure beet seed districts —
Regulation — Penalties for violation.
Study and improvement of county gove r n m e n t — Board of county commissioners — Charges and expenses.
County resources — Power of board to
provide for development.
Historic and cultural resource programs.
County resource development committee
— Appointment of members — Terms,
compensation and expenses, \acancies
and removal of members.
County resource development committee
— Election of officers — Employment
of executive director.
County resource development committee
— Functions of committee.
County resources — Power of board to
contract with other authorities
County resources — Expenditure of
county funds authorized
Rewards for information — Law enforcement — Protection of count\ property.
County may adopt Utah Procurement
Code.
Contracting for management, maintenance, operation, or construction of
jail^.

17-5-1. C o u n t y c o m m i s s i o n e r s — N u m b e r .
Each county sh<Jl have a board of count\ commissioners cwisi-'.ing of three member^
19"><
17-5-2. KlUibility — H o w ole< ted.
Each ii" : .. - : of ihe board ui coun + v commissioner*
shall h" an e'*- :*o»r ol the count v v. Inch he represents
nm
l must h,
TH1
been such f . r a t leas
- >ear immediately preceding his election, and he shell he elected
h\ th.'» qualified electors of the county at large.
19V?
17-5-3. T e r m of office.
County C"mrn!.—iuiK?s shall be elected in each
county at the general election next preceding t\iij expiration of th»" tern> of office of incumbents; one for a
term of four \»-at» arid on*- for a term of tv,o years,
and each shall hold office for the term for which
eh fed arid until his sutcv-sor is elected and has
qualified They shall take off'o* on the first Monday
in J a i . u a i \ next fallowing tru-ir election.
iy">3
17-5-4. V a c a n c i e s , h o w filled.
When a vacancy occurs in the board of county commissiorier» through ineligibility, iesignation or death
of an incumbent or of an ofiicer-oh-ct before quahfymg, or refusal to act, or fr»i any other reason, the
vacancy shall be filled as follows:
U ) If two yeais remain on the unexpired terms
as nf the- first Monday in J a n u a r y next and 30
day.s. or more remain before the general election
or if such office shall be vacant by the first Monday of J a n u a r y next due to a certified written
resignation submitted when 30 days or more remain before th»* general election, then the vacancy for the unexpired term shall be filled under
the provisions of Sections 20-4-9 and 20-4-11.5,
except that the vacancy shall be filled in the in-

17-5-9

terim period by appointment according to the
provisions in (2) below.
(2) If such vacancy occurs when fewer than 30
days remain befoie the general election, then the
vacancy shall be filled by the board by appointment from a list of at least six persons who have
been endorsed in writing by the county central
committee of the party to which the person belonged who occasioned the vacancy. Should the
board fail to make the appointment within 30
days after the vacancy occurs, the clerk shall notify the governor of the fact, and the governor
shall within 30 days after receipt of a notice fill
the vacancy by appointment from the aforementioned list. If at any time there shall not be a
majority of the board remaining in office, the
governor shall appoint one or two commissioners,
as the case may be, from the list or lists, until
there shall be a majority, and the majority shall
select the third commissioner as herein provided
Appointees shall hold office for the unexpired
term for which appointed or until a successor is
elected and has qualified.
J979
17-5-5.

Chairman — Quorum — May administer
oaths.
County commissioners shall elect one of their number chairman. The chairman shall preside at all
meetings of the board, and in case of his absence or
inability to act the members present must, by an order entered in their minutes, select one of their number to act as chairman temporarily. Any member of
the board may administer oatfTs to any person when
necessary in the performance of his official duties.
Not less than two members shall constitute a quorum
for the transaction of business, and no act of the
board shall be valid or binding unless two members
concur therein
1933
17-5-6. Meetings — At c o u n t y seat.
Tie- board of county commissioners must provide by
oreiiii.-nee for the holdu.g of regular meeting-- of th«huiiid at the eount\ .seat
IHVJ
17-5-7.

Special m e e t i n g s — H o w called — Business limited.
If at any time the business of the county requires a
special meeting of the hoaid, such meeting may be
ordered by a majority of the board or by the chairman
thereof The order must be signed by the members or
chairman calling such meeting and must be entered
in the minutes of the board Five days' notice of such
meeting must be given by the clerk to the members
not joining in the order. The order must specify the
business to be transact' d at such meeting, and none
other than that specified shall be transacted at such
special meeting unless all the members are present
and consent thereto
195^
17-5-8.

Meetings to b e p u b l i c — B o o k s a n d
records.
All meetings of the board must be public, and the
books, records and accounts must be kept at the office
of the clerk, open at all times during usual business
hours for public inspection.
1H53
17-5-9.

Rules a n d r e g u l a t i o n s g o v e r n i n g b o a r d
a n d t r a n s a c t i o n of b u s i n e s s .
The board of county commissioners* shall have
power to make and enfoice such rules and regulations
for the government of the board, the preservation of
order and the transaction of business as may be necessary.
1953

RULE 56

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

No judgment by default shall be entered against
the State of Utah or against an officer or agency
thereof unless the claimant establishes his claim or
right to relief by c\ idence satisfactory to the court.
RULE 56. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(a) Tor Claimant.
(b) For Defending Parly.
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon.
(d> Ciue Not Fully Adjudicated on Motion.
(e) Forn of Affiduwls; Further 7eMimon>; Defense
Kttjufrcd.
(f) When Affidavits are Unavailable.
(£) Affidavits Made in Bad Faith.

(a) For Claimant.
A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory
judgment may, at any time after the expiration of
twenty da>s from the commencement of the action
or after service of a motion for summary judgment
by the adverse party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor
upon all or any part thereof.
(b) For Defending Fart).
A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is
sought, may, at any time, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon.
The motion shall be served at least ten days
before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse
party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as^a matter
of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability
alone although there is a genuine issue as to the
amount of damages.
(d) Case Not Fully Adjudicated on Motion.
If on motion under this Rule judgment is not
rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief
asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the
hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings
and the evidence before it and by interrogating
counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material
facts exist without substantial controversy and what
material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying
the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of
damages or other relief is not in controversy, and
directing such further proceedings in the action as
are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so
specified shall be deemed established, and the trial
shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of Affidavits; Further Testimony; Defense
Required.
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made
on personal knowledge; shall set forth such facts as
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify
to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in
an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be sup-
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plemented or opposed by depositions, answers to
interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a
motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this Rule, <m adverse party may
not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his
pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in thib Rule, must set forth spevsfic
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if
appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) When Affidavits are Unavailable.
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party
opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons
stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify
his opposition, the court may refuse the application
for judgment or may order a continuance to permit
affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken
or discovery to be had or may make such other
order as is just.
(g) Affidavits Made in Bad Faith.
Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at
any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this Rule are presented in bad faith or solely
for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith
order the party employing thern to pay to the other
party the amount of the reasonable expenses which
the filing of the affidavits earned him to incur,
including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of
contempt.
RULE 57. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
The procedure for obtaining a declaratory judgment pursuant to chapter 33 of Title 78, U.C.A.
1953, shall be in accordance with these Rules, and
the right to trial by jury may be demanded under
the circumstances and in the manner provided in
Rules 38 and 39. The existence of another adequate
remedy does not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate. The court
may order a speedy hearing of an action for a declaratory judgment and may advance it on the calendar.
RULE 58A. ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
(a) Judgment Upon the Verdict of a Jury.
(b) Judgment in Other Cases.
(c) When Judgment Entered; Notation in Register of
Actions and Judgment Docket.
(d) Notice of Signing or Entry of Judgment.
(e) Judgment After Death of a Party.
(0 Judgment by Confession.

(a) Judgment Upon the Verdict of a Jury.
Unless the court otherwise directs and subject to
the provisions of Rule 54(b), judgment upon the
verdict of a jury shall be forthwith signed by the
clerk and filed. If there is a special verdict or a
general verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories returned by a jury pursuant to Rule 49, the
court shall direct the appropriate judgment which
shall be forthwith signed by the clerk and filed.
(b) Judgment in Other Cases.
Except as provided in subdivision (a) hereof and
subdivision (b) (1) of Rule 55, all judgments shall be
signed by the judge and filed with the clerk.
(c) When Judgment Entered; Notation in Register of
Actions and Judgment Docket.
A judgment is complete and shall be deemed
entered for all purposes, except the creation of a
lien on real property, when the same is signed and

For Annotations, consult CODE*Co's Annotation Service
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